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Abstract
This paper discusses mens rea as an element of crime, examining the legislative wording of mens rea 
and the vital role that this wording plays in the formation of the mens rea element in the Qatari Penal 
Code. The purpose of this paper is to improve the legislative wording of mens rea in the Qatari Penal 
Code. This paper also addresses general questions about how criminal mens rea relates to criminal 
justice, what makes mens rea ambiguous, and how we can solve this ambiguity. More seriously, this 
paper seeks to determine whether legislative omission contributes to the ambiguity of mens rea, thus 
adversely affecting criminal justice. In conclusion, this paper offers recommendations for the Qatari 
Penal Code to improve its approach to mens rea.
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الركن المعنوي للجريمة في نصوص قانون العقوبات القطري: نقد 
واقتراحات
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اأ�ستاذ القانون العام الم�ساعد، كلية القانون، جامعة قطر
aq.ude.uq@irmahsla.delahK
ملخص
يهدف هذا البحث اإلى الك�سف عن العيوب الت�سريعية في ن�سو�ص قانون العقوبات القطري ال�سادر عام 4002 والمتعلقة 
بالن�سو�ص التي ناق�ست الركن المعنوي. حيث يناق�ص هذا البحث م�ساألة عدم وجود �سياغة ت�سريعية �سليمة لتحديد اأنواع 
الركن المعنوي والمتمثلة بالق�سد الجنائي والخطاأ غير العمدي. كما يناق�ص البحث م�ساألة عدم وجود معايير و�سوابط 
لتحديد مدى توافر عن�سر الركن المعنوي لدى المتهم من عدمه. بالإ�سافة اإلى ما تم ذكره، اإن الم�سرع القطري لم يحدد 
تعريف ل�سورة الق�سد المبا�سر و�سورة الق�سد الحتمالي في ن�ص المادة رقم 23 من قانون العقوبات القطري، واللتين تعدان 
�سورتان هامتان من �سور الق�سد الجنائي. ومن م�ساكل البحث، عدم وجود تعريف وا�سح لأنواع الخطاأ غير العمدي 
والمتمثلة ب�سورة الخطاأ الواعي و�سورة الخطاأ غير الواعي في المادة رقم 23 من قانون العقوبات القطري. كما تعد م�سكلة 
الجمع بالعقوبة بين جميع اأنواع الخطاأ غير العمدي مخالفة اأ�سا�سية لفكرة تنا�سب العقوبة والتي ت�سترط اأن تكون العقوبة 
متنا�سبة ومت�سقة مع الحالة الذهنية والنف�سية للجاني. وفي نهاية البحث، يقدم الباحث الحلول والقتراحات لتطوير 
ن�سو�ص قانون العقوبات القطري التي تناق�ص الركن المعنوي وذلك لتنجب الأ�سرار الناتجة عن هذه الم�سكلات القانونية.
الكلمات المفتاحية:  قانون العقوبات، الركن المعنوي، الركن المادي، الجريمة، الق�سد الجنائي، الق�سد 
العام، الق�سد المبا�سر، الق�سد الحتمالي، الخطاأ غير العمدي، الخطاأ الواعي، الخطاأ غير الواعي، تنا�سب العقوبة، المتهم
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3Introduction
Mens rea is considered one of the most ambiguous subjects in criminal law.1 It generates considerable 
confusion and difficulty not only in determining guilt or innocence, but also in the sentencing of criminal 
offenses.2 The ambiguity of mens rea is likely attributable to three causes: the nature of mens rea, the 
legislative wording of mens rea, and the judicial interpretation of mens rea. The nature of mens rea refers 
to a non-apparent element that resides in the defendant’s mind;3 “judicial interpretation” refers to the 
methods and tools judges use to interpret mens rea; and “legislative wording” refers to how legislators 
draft and define mens rea in the law. 
It is very important to mention that the ambiguity inherent in mens rea cannot be eliminated. This type 
of ambiguity is inevitable because it is related to the nature of mens rea as a non-apparent element. This 
paper is concerned with the ambiguity specifically created by the legislative wording of mens rea, that 
is, the vocabulary with which the legislature describes the required mental state, and the related legal 
framework for drawing distinctions among different types or degrees of culpability. 
The ambiguity in the legislative wording of mens rea may be divided into two types: internal and external. 
Internal ambiguity focuses on the subjects that relate directly to mens rea, so as not to be detached from 
it; in other words, internal ambiguity focuses on the legislator’s approach to mens rea, paying particular 
attention to the legal texts of the criminal code that determine the level of mens rea (e.g., texts that 
use terms such as purposely, knowingly, recklessness, etc.), the legislative wording that includes the 
vocabulary of mens rea (e.g., intentional, willful, etc.), and the legal texts that connect mens rea to the 
offense elements analysis (e.g., criminal homicide constitutes murder when it is committed purposely or 
knowingly, or when the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons) or the default 
rule governing mens rea.
In contrast, external ambiguity focuses on the subjects that relate indirectly to mens rea but may be 
captured or categorized in different legal provisions of the Qatari Penal Code, such as insanity, intoxication, 
or mistake of law or facts. These subjects are not essential to mens rea, but they do affect it as they concern 
a criminal’s mental state and criminal culpability. When legislatures draft provisions for these subjects, 
in discussing conditions or elements they may further contribute indirectly to the ambiguity of mens rea.
This paper focuses on the subjects of internal ambiguity with regards to mens rea. The first section examines 
the general constitutional problems caused by the legislative wording of mens rea in Qatari legislation, 
discussing the legislative omission that has resulted in jurisprudential and judiciary efforts to correct 
such omission by creating a new type of mens rea. This approach by the Qatari legislature has caused 
constitutional problems in general, and conflicts with fundamental legal principles. The second section of 
this paper targets the legislative wording of mens rea provisions in the Qatari Penal Code that addresses 
various issues, such as the default rule and the types of mens rea. This section focuses on the current mens 
rea types, whether mentioned by the legislator or used by the judiciary through jurisprudence. The focus 
here will be on these types, introducing their problems and suggesting solutions for their development. 
Lastly, in the third section, this paper proposes a model that includes all proposed modifications that 
should be included in the Qatari Penal Code. These modifications include new forms of mens rea and the 
criteria that govern them.
1- William J. Stuntz & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Defining Crimes, 90 (2nd ed., 2014).
2- Ike Oraegbunam & R. Okey Ounkwo, Mens rea principle and criminal jurisprudence in Nigeria, 2 Nnamdi Azikiwe University 
Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence, 225, 225 (2011), available at http://www.ajol.info/index.php/naujilj/
article/view/82407.
3- Therefore, the nature of mens rea as a non-apparent element makes it very difficult to prove in court, especially when the 
prosecutor must prove that the defendant had a conscious intent to commit the crime.
4It is important to mention that because the law is new—the current Qatari Penal Code was drafted in 2004 
and promulgated in May 2004—defects are not unexpected. New laws in any country are always subject to 
criticism. Additionally, the Qatari Penal Code has not been subject to many academic or technical studies 
until today. This paper provides suggestions aimed at solving the defects in the law.
I. ConstItutIonal Problem
The most critical problem facing mens rea in the Qatari Penal Code (QPC) is legislative omission. This 
legislative omission has caused a lack of clarity that affects criminal justice in a host of deleterious 
ways. This section discusses the definition of legislative omission, citing specific examples in the Qatari 
Penal Code; it then presents the negative consequences caused by this problem.
A. Legislative Omission
Legislative omission is deemed one of the most important causes contributing to the ambiguity 
and subsequent misunderstanding of mens rea, adversely affecting criminal justice. Legislative 
omission occurs when the legislature overlooks an important aspect of a particular subject, leading 
to legislative ineffectiveness and contradiction to the Constitution.1 It is defined as legislative 
inadequacy or deficiency regarding a given topic or issue.2 Legislative omission has two types. The 
first is drafting deficiency, which means the legislator fails to effectively and comprehensively draft 
the legal provision so as to cover the important aspects of a particular subject. The second type of 
omission is drafting ambiguity, which means the legislator drafts a provision that is so ambiguous 
that it becomes very difficult to understand and enforce.3 Namely, the legislature uses ambiguous 
words, terms, or phrases that make the provisions unclear, sometimes even leading to absurd results.
In the Qatari Penal Code, legislative omission contributes to the ambiguity of mens rea in two ways. 
The first includes the overlooking of and deficiency in addressing important issues in mens rea, such 
as its types. The second occurs when the legislature ambiguously deals with a certain article, leading 
to its ineffectiveness and failing to reveal the legislator’s intention in the legislative wording.
1. Negative Consequences of Legislative Omission
Criminal law is one of the most important fields of legislation when it comes to liberties, rights, 
and public interests; it secures the balance between individual and public interests.4 With this 
role, criminal law is subject to many constitutional principles that ensure that the law shall not 
abuse individual freedoms and rights. The most important of these principles is related to the 
legality of crimes and their penalties; specifically, this principle states that any dispute arising 
in court should be settled by the legislative power, according to the legal provisions made and 
published before the dispute arose.5 The wording of the Qatari legislation regarding mens rea 
negatively affects the legality principle in two ways. First, the legislature does not mention all of 
the types of mens rea, which requires certain phrases to deal with its legal definition, criteria, 
and elements. Secondly, the legislature has inadequately dealt with the legal articles that address 
mens rea, making it ambiguous and unclear.
1- Jawahar Adeel, The Constitutional Review of the Legislative Omission, 4 (1st ed., 2016).
2- Id.
3- Id. at 24.
4- Ahmed Fathi Srouer, The Constitutional Criminal Law, 5 (2006). See also the Constitution of Qatar, Article 40 (2004). The 
Qatari Constitution of 2004 provides for this principle in Article No. 40: “No crime and no punishment shall apply, save as 
prescribed by the Law.”
5- Ahamed Fthee Srouer, Alwaseet in Criminal Law, 97 (6th ed., 2015).
5Legislative omission also leads to a clash between legislative and judicial authorities. In accordance 
with the Qatari Constitution, the legislative authority is the only authority empowered to enact 
laws; neither the executive authority nor the judicial authority may practice such a role.1 Therefore, 
the role of judges should be limited to the application of law to disputes and should not, under any 
circumstances, extend to the establishment of a legal rule. However, legislative omission forces 
judges t o assume the role of legislator, amending and filling in gaps in the penal code’s provisions.2
Moreover, legislative omission harms the accused’s ability to defend himself due to the absence of 
legislative texts related to mens rea.3 Mens rea is the element that defines the criminal’s liability, 
which may confer upon the criminal a death sentence or innocence.4 The mens rea element should 
be accurate and clear in its wording because of its sensitivity in defining the defendant’s criminal 
liability.5 The defendant, who depends on the opinions of jurisprudence and the unbinding decisions 
of the courts, is greatly affected by his right to defense, especially when the legislator neglects to 
define most mens rea types, such as conditional intent, which is punished by the death sentence. 
The accused should be punished according to the law, and any judgment that violates the law or 
explains the law differently from the legislator’s intention should not be the source of punishment.
It must be noted here that no criminal code can achieve perfect clarity. Defects in law are 
expected and may even be desired by legislators for many reasons, such as giving judges room to 
apply justice. There is no criminal code that completely mechanizes judges’ tasks or forbids them 
from applying justice as required. In other words, judges should have room to evaluate cases, and 
jurisprudence should be able to study and explain the law. However, these tasks must be based 
on legislative wording, that is, words or phrases in the provisions of law that allow judges and 
jurisprudence to carry out their tasks. For example, the phrase “he is aware that it is practically 
certain that his conduct will cause such a result,”6 or the degree of awareness in the word knowingly 
in the Model Penal Code in the United States (MPC), have been subject to many explanations by 
legal scholars, and judges have defined these notions in many ways.7 This interpretation by judges 
and scholars has a legal basis, which is the phrase “practically certain.” In contrast, in the Qatari 
Penal Code, this cannot happen because indirect intent (knowingly in the MPC) is not mentioned 
at all in the law. Any efforts to explain the degree of awareness in this type of mens rea will be 
too ambiguous and will not have any basis in the law, as the type itself— “indirect intent”—is not 
mentioned in the Qatari Penal Code. Furthermore, it is inappropriate to expand the word “will” 
or “desire” in Article No. 32 of the QPC to include awareness, as desire is completely different 
from awareness and both represent two distinctive elements of mens rea.8 
II. sPeCIfIC Problems regardIng Mens Rea In the QatarI Penal Code
This section discusses the problems related to mens rea in the Qatari Penal Code. It first examines 
the article that contains the problem and its negative consequences, then presents suggestions for 
1- See the Constitution of Qatar, Article 76 (2004).
2- I was told by many judges that they have to perform the role of the legislator because of legislative omission. Their role 
must be limited to the application of the provisions of the law utilizing the facts at hand, and must not extend to the 
enactment of laws.
3- Adeel, supra note 4, at 26.
4- Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Criminal Law 153 (2d ed. 2012).
5- Oraegbunam & Ounkwo, supra note 2, at 2.
6- See Model Penal Code, § 2.02 (2) (b) (emphasis added).
7- See Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and willful blindness, 102, Yale L.J. 2231, 2237 (1993).
8- See Katheryn Brown & Angela Davis, Criminal Law Book, 62 (1st ed., 2016).
6amending or repealing said article. This revision would ensure the development and activation of mens 
rea texts, especially since there has not been any amendment regarding mens rea in the Penal Code 
since its issuance. This revision should focus on the amendments of the current mens rea provisions by 
adding a new type of mens rea and cancelling some other types. Jurisprudential opinions, which are 
adopted by the Qatari judiciary, should also be revised and amended before legislators adopt them in 
the Qatari Penal Code.
A. The Problem of Indirect Intention
The first problem is related to paragraph 2 of Article No. 32, which provides the definition of intent.1 
The current definition is limited to direct intent (general intent); it does not contain indirect intent, 
which describes a situation in which the defendant could foresee the criminal result as practically 
certain to occur (see knowingly in the MPC), although he did not desire to produce the criminal 
result. Therefore, the current definition of intent is incomplete, as it fails to encompass situations 
in which the defendant did not desire the criminal result that occurred due to his criminal conduct, 
even if he expected it. Qatari legislature requires that the defendant’s desire directly cause the 
result, which is similar to the definition of purposely stated by the Model Penal Code. 
In comparing the criminal laws of Arab Gulf countries, it clear that the Qatari legislature’s position 
is completely different from other laws. Emirati law, for example, addresses the situations in which 
the defendant wants only to engage in the conduct, expecting that the result will happen as an 
effect of his criminal conduct, though he does not have the desire (intent) to commit it. The law 
states, “The intent arises when the culprit’s will moves toward either the commission or omission of 
an act, where such commission or omission is legally defined as a crime for the purpose of producing 
a direct effect or any other criminal result which the offender has expected.”2 In this way, the 
Emirati legislature has decided that the result that the defendant expects lies within the definition 
of intent, which the Qatari legislature excludes. For this reason, Qatari legislature is best described 
as adopting one form of intent—purposely, wherein the defendant desires to commit the criminal 
result—and it has excluded the form of indirect intent (or knowingly) in contradiction with the Model 
Penal Code, English law, Emirati law, and other laws that adopt this type of mens rea.3
1. Negative Consequences
This definition disregards the element of awareness, failing to ask whether the defendant was 
aware that the criminal result would occur as a consequence of his conduct. This element is 
critical, as it reflects the mental state that the defendant may have had at the time he committed 
the criminal conduct. Many judgments discuss cases where knowledge and foresight of the result 
were inevitable because only the defendant’s mental state, not his desire, matters in a crime.4 In 
such cases, justice will not be achieved by judges. Resorting to jurisprudence may be a solution 
for judges to avoid this problem, because jurisprudence distinguishes between awareness of the 
result versus the desire to cause the result. But this may contradict many constitutional principles, 
including legality, as discussed above. 
2. Solution 
This solution recommends amending the second paragraph of Article No. 32 by adding knowingly 
1- Qatari Penal Code, Article 32 (2004): “The intention is present when the will of the perpetrator is directed to commit or 
omit an act, in order to produce a result punishable by law.”
2- Emirati Criminal Law, Article 38 (1987) (emphasis added).
3- The Model Penal Code uses the term knowingly instead of indirect intent.
4- See State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2000).
7(or indirect intent) to the wording of intent, as in English criminal law. The article would then 
read as follows: Intent is present when the will of the perpetrator is directed to commit or omit 
an act, in order to produce a result punishable by law. Intent is also present when the criminal 
is practically certain that the criminal result will occur as a consequence of his conduct, even if 
he does not directly desire this criminal result. This solution will provide a legal basis for indirect 
intent and set a standard for the degree of awareness.
B. Problems with the Definition of Types of Mistake
The second problem arises in the third paragraph of Article No. 32, which provides the definition of 
a mistake. The drafting of this article is too ambiguous; the Qatari legislature has defined neither 
the type of “mistake” nor the standards upon which we can determine whether or not the defendant 
made a mistake. Rather, the legislature only states some examples of mistake.1 It is not clear whether 
these examples are limited (or exclusive), and the legislature does not clarify their intended meaning, 
leading to more ambiguity. 
The Kuwaiti legislature is much better than the Qatari legislature in defining “mistake,” as shown 
in Article No. 44:
“The mistake is available in case the defendant acted, on committing the act, in a manner in which 
the reasonable person would not have acted if he was in the defendant’s situation and his act is 
described as negligence, incaution, rashness or noncomplying with the law of the lists.
And the defendant is considered to be acting in such manner in case he did not expect, while 
committing the act, the results that a reasonable person could have been expected and have not 
prevented its occurrence nonetheless. Or he did expect the results, but he counted on his skill to 
prevent its occurrence, but it took place nonetheless.”2
As we can see from the second paragraph, the Kuwaiti legislature has outlined both the meaning of 
“mistake” and the standard that should be used by the judge to prove that a mistake occurred. The 
legislature states that one of the definitions of mistake is that “[the defendant] did not expect, while 
committing the act, the results that the reasonable person could have been expected.” This type 
of mistake is similar to negligence in the Model Penal Code. Moreover, the results expected by the 
defendant lie within the definition of a mistake: “Or he did expect the results, but he counted on his 
skill to prevent its occurrence, but it took place nonetheless” (similar to recklessness in the MPC). 
1. Negative Consequences
Article No. 32 of the Qatari Penal Code does not reflect the concept of mens rea. Mens rea, which 
shows the relationship between the defendant and the crime, primarily focuses on the mental 
state of the defendant at the time in which the defendant committed the crime.3 The legislature 
in this article does not state any mental states that make the defendant eligible for punishment; it 
does not clarify the criminal’s mental state during the act, or the mental state that the defendant 
must have possessed during the criminal act. The Qatari legislature only mentions some examples 
of mistake.4 However, the examples here do not reflect the criminal’s mental state; rather, they 
reflect the criminal’s material conduct. That means the legislature does not distinguish between 
1- Qatari Penal Code, Article 32 (2004): “Mistake is available when the result on which the law imposes penalty occurs because 
of the mistake of the defendant, whether this mistake was due to negligence, carelessness, incaution, rashness, or non-
complying with the laws or regulations.”
2- Kuwaiti Criminal Code, Article 44 (1960).
3- Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable mens rea, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, 51, 52 (2003–2004).
4- Qatari Penal Code, Article 32 (2004).
8the defendant’s criminal act and the defendant’s mental state. The examples given are not clear 
in terms of whether or not they are exclusive, and the legislature does not clarify their intended 
meaning, leading to more ambiguity.1
Additionally, this article adversely affects the defendant’s rights to defend himself. It provides the 
judge with very broad discretion for defining what he considers to be a mistake. According to the 
current definition of mistake, the judge is not limited to a mental state or a standard upon which 
to base his decision. Only the judge has the authority to define what is and is not a mistake. The 
defendant is unable to challenge the court decision because there is no legal basis for his challenge. 
That kind of discretion results in the improper conviction of defendants and negatively affects 
criminal justice. There should be a clear text defining the mental states that deserve punishment. 
Lastly, there are no standards for identifying whether or not the criminal made a mistake. Here, 
the legislature does not mention whether the standard to be applied is objective or subjective; 
such a standard ensures justice and the fair application of the law. These standards are very 
important in deciding whether or not the defendant deserves punishment. They are based on 
technical matters such as the reasonable person in the defendant’s situation or the characteristics 
that should be considered to determine the defendant’s liability.2 When the legislature ignores 
a standard that can determine criminal liability, that could give the judge broad discretion for 
defining criminal liability and he can only define these standards. This omission prejudices the 
defendant’s constitutional rights when defending himself.
Resorting to jurisprudence may be a solution that fills the legislative gap, but that will result in 
a contrast to many constitutional principles, such as legality, legal certainty, and other matters, 
as discussed above.
2. Solutions
This solution recommends drafting a definition of mistake in Article No. 32. This definition 
would outline the types of mistakes and the general standards that govern them. For example, 
jurisprudence considers mistake to cover both conscious and unconscious mistakes, so that when 
the legislature intends to adopt this approach, it can state the definition of mistake: Mistake is 
a conscious or unconscious failure by the defendant to adhere to the required standard of care 
and caution of the reasonable person. In other words, the definition of mistake is related to 
the defendant’s mental state. The phrase “conscious or unconscious” refers to whether or not 
the defendant expected the occurrence of the criminal result as a consequence of his conduct.3 
This definition also points to a particular standard when the defendant commits the failure—the 
objective standard.
Furthermore, if legislators want to adopt the forms of recklessness (conscious mistake) and 
negligence (unconscious mistake) and considers them both to fall under the mistake type of mens 
rea, then the article should point out the legislative adoption of these two types, stating: The 
defendant is considered to be acting in such a manner in this case that he did not expect, while 
committing the act, the results that a reasonable person should have expected, or he expected 
that the result could possibly occur, but disregarded this possibility. This disregard involves 
a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s 
1- Ashraf Shams Aldein, Explanation of the Criminal Law in Qatar: General Part, 346 (1st ed. 2010).
2- See George P. Fletcher, Basic Types of Criminal Law, 118 (1998).
3- Rmsees Bhanm, The General Theory of Criminal Law, 657 (3rd ed., 1997).
9situation.1 This text defines the two types of mistake: recklessness and negligence. The reason 
for considering these two types under the form of mistake is that jurisprudence and the judiciary 
do not differentiate between them. This wording also defines the standard that should be applied 
to a conscious and unconscious mistake, which is an objective standard.2 
Another solution recommends abandoning the current examples of mistake in Article No. 32. 
Those examples do not reflect any mental state as explored by mens rea; instead, they cause 
disturbance and confusion. The term “negligence” in the previous article means “omission,”3 while 
the definition of negligence in other legal systems means “non-awareness of the result.” Also, this 
article considers the “non-complying with the law of the lists” to be an example of mistake.4 This 
example of mistake constitutes a problem as the legislature presumes liability once the defendant 
violates the relevant rules and regulations, unless the defendant can prove that the reason for 
the accident is attributable not to him but to an extraneous factor.5 
Additionally, two other reasons are very important to show that this example of mistake is not 
suitable for criminal punishment. First, the initial conduct that violates the law of the lists has a 
very low level of blameworthiness, and it contains very trivial fault. This type of mistake can be a 
basis of civil liability but not for criminal liability,6 especially when the law punishes the defendant 
in a homicide case for three years if the death is due to his non-compliance with the law of lists. 
Second is the problem of moral luck. A thousand people can violate the law of lists; however, just 
because one was not lucky and caused an injury due to his violation, doesn’t mean there are more 
sufficient grounds to punish him for three years.7 This person, while violating the law of lists, is 
not more blameworthy than the other nine hundred ninety-nine persons who engaged in the same 
violation. This example is very common and not criminal, and could lead to punishing people just 
because they were not lucky enough while violating the law of lists.
C. The Problem with Failing to Distinguish between Different Types of Mistake
This section discusses the issues that arise when lawmakers disregard distinctions between recklessness 
and negligence (or conscious and unconscious mistake), instead grouping them under one form and one 
punishment. The cause of this problem lies with the legislator, the judiciary, and the jurisprudence, 
as the legislator does not distinguish between a conscious mistake (recklessness) and an unconscious 
mistake (negligence). In addition, the judiciary, who resorts to jurisprudence in this matter, does not 
distinguish between these two types of mistake when it comes to matters of fault and punishment.
1. Negative Consequences 
This problem adversely affects the role of mens rea, as mens rea supposes that each mental state 
1- Similar to the Kuwaiti legislature that clearly stated the types of mistake. See Kuwaiti Criminal Code, Article 44 (1960).
2- However, in conscious mistake (recklessness), the court must first be assured as to whether the defendant was aware that 
there was a possibility that the result would occur from his conduct, and the standard here is a subjective standard.
3- Judgment, The Qatari Court of Cassation, Case No. 36 on May 8, 2007. The court also mentioned, as an example of 
negligence, the defendant’s failure to verify that the victim exited the machine before operating it, directly causing his 
death.
4- Qatari Penal Code, Article 32 (2004): “...or non-complying with the laws or regulations.” See also Judgment, Egyptian Court 
of Cassation, Case No. 166, Cassion Collective Rules, 655 on June 10, 1985.
5- Judgment, The Qatari Court of Cassation, Case No. 129 on  June 9, 2008.
6- For more information, see Ariel Pora, Expanding liability for negligence per se, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 979, 981 (2009).
7- For more information, see Christopher Jackson, Tort, moral luck, and blame, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 57, 86 (2012).
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has a defined degree of blame and fault that deserves a defined punishment.1 There is no difference 
in the criminal’s mental states while committing crimes. Mens rea focuses on distinguishing between 
defendants according to their mental or psychological states when they commit their crimes. 
The current situation, which treats negligence the same way it treats recklessness, will not achieve 
retribution and fairness because it imposes a punishment on recklessness that is less than what the 
defendant deserves, as the degree of culpability in recklessness is higher than in negligence.2 For 
example, the civil law system holds that mens rea generally consists of two elements: awareness 
and desire.3 A conscious mistake is presumed to contain the element of awareness, in which the 
defendant foresees the criminal result.4 The element of desire does not factor in as the criminal 
does not desire to cause the criminal result. Therefore, a reckless person meets one element of 
mens rea: awareness. However, negligence (or unconscious mistake) does not require the defendant 
to be aware of the potential criminal result while committing the crime,5 in which case, both 
the element of awareness and the element of desire are absent. It is therefore not logical, legal, 
or just to punish the criminal who foresaw the occurrence of the criminal result with the same 
punishment as the criminal who did not foresee it. Recklessness meets one element of mens 
rea—awareness—but negligence does not meet any element of mens rea and takes into account 
neither awareness nor desire. Differentiating between the punishment for these two types of 
mistake will ensure retribution and fairness.
One justification for punishing criminals is the hope of deterring the commission of crimes in 
the future;6 however, when the law ensures that a reckless defendant is punished with a lesser 
punishment, individuals will not be deterred. For example, recklessness often occurs in car 
accidents, when the driver expects a criminal result (i.e., striking a pedestrian) but continues 
his risky conduct (i.e., speeding in a populated area). According to many statistics, the number 
of car accidents in the State of Qatar is excessive for the size of the state and its population of 
1.5 million. 7In 2012, Qatar had the highest number of car accidents per capita in the world.8 One 
reason for this figure may be the lack of deterrence from the punishment of reckless drivers, who 
are treated the same as those who are negligent. 
2. Solutions
One solution recommends distinguishing conscious mistake (or recklessness) from unconscious 
mistake (or negligence) by adding separate provisions to the definition of each type of mistake 
under Qatari law. Therefore, the legislature should add two articles, each of which adopts one type 
1- Stephen F. Smith, Proportional mens rea, University of Virginia Law School: Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series 1 (2008). See also Darryl K. Brown, Federal mens rea interpretation and the limits of culpability’s relevance, 75 
Law and Contemporary Problems 109, 109 (2012). The author states that “fault is a determination based on intention 
or conscious awareness of the wrongful conduct, its consequences, and the significant circumstances in which it occurs. 
Together wrongdoing and fault make an offender blameworthy (or culpable), which justifies imposing criminal punishments. 
An important corollary is that criminal punishment is set in some proportion to wrongdoing and fault; culpability limits 
punishment.”
2- See Stuntz & Hoffmann, supra note 1, at 207–209. See also Robinson & Cahill, supra note 12, at 12.
3- Aldein, supra note 25, at 282.
4- Bhanm, supra note 27, at 657.
5- Aldein, supra note 25, at 349.
6- For more information about the role of deterrence, see Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 30 (2nd 
ed.,1998).
7- Available at https://dohanews.co/number-of-people-killed-in-qatar-traffic-accidents-hits-new-high/. See also https://
dohanews.co/study-road-deaths-qatar-accidents-occur-sundays-mondays/.
8- Available at http://www.raya.com/news/pages/532790c9-c2c1-4096-bba4-e8aa0bb8b9df.
11
of mistake. One article would cover recklessness (conscious mistake), and the other would cover 
negligence (unconscious mistake). These new types of mistake should be evaluated under a clear 
and explicit standard, an objective standard, which is missing in the current Qatari Penal Code. 
In cases in which the legislature does not intend to distinguish between conscious mistake and 
unconscious mistake, choosing instead to consider them as one form, the legislature should at least 
consider conscious mistake as an aggravating circumstance in unintentional homicides. Homicide 
crimes are the most dangerous and merit a more severe punishment for the criminal who expects the 
victim’s death than for the criminal who does not.1 The law can achieve this goal by adding “conscious 
mistake” to the aggravating circumstances of unintentional homicide listed in Article No. 313, which 
states the following: “The penalty stipulated in the two preceding Articles shall be doubled, depending 
on the circumstances, if the crime is the result of a transgression of the offender’s occupation, 
profession or job, or the offender is under the influence of narcotics or alcohol, or the crime leads 
to the death of a person or the injury of more than three people, or the offender fails to help or 
seek help for the victim despite having the capability to do so.”2 This solution recommends that the 
legislature add the foresight of the criminal result as an aggravating circumstance within the current 
circumstances in Article No. 313. The French legislature has adopted this approach and considers 
the foresight of the result as an aggravating circumstance in both homicide and non-fatal crimes.3
D. The Problem of the Default Rule
The last phrase of Article No. 32 outlines the default rule of the Qatari Penal Code, stating the 
following: “Unless the Law explicitly provides for Intention, the perpetrator shall be liable for the 
offence whether it was committed intentionally or by mistake.” 4 This article shows that mistake is 
the minimum default rule, that is, whenever the defendant commits an act, he is punishable whether 
he committed it intentionally or mistakenly, unless the intention is clearly stipulated.5 This means 
that in cases in which the legislature does not stipulate any form of mens rea regarding a specific 
crime, the defendant will be punished regardless of whether he committed the crime with desire 
(intent) or by mistake.
A number of comparative laws, by contrast, provide that the defendant will not be punished for a 
mistake unless the legislature has clearly stipulated the type of mistake committed. For example, 
the Kuwaiti law states that “[i]f the law does not openly stipulate the punishment to the act because 
it is coupled with a mistake, then the defendant will not be punished unless there is an intent of 
the defendant.”6 In this way, the Kuwaiti legislature has decided that the defendant should receive 
punishment due to committing a criminal act by mistake only when the legislature expressly stipulates 
the form of mistake. When the legislature does not specify any form of mens rea, the crime can only 
merit punishment due to the inclusion of intent. The Kuwaiti legislature has thus adopted a form of 
intent as a default rule.
1. Negative Consequences 
Mistake is the minimum default rule. This is wrong for two reasons. First, the law does not define 
1- Brown & Davis, supra note 16, at 190.
2- Qatari Penal Code, Article 313 (2004).
3- However, while the form of conscious mistake should not be an aggravating circumstance, it should be an independent type 
of mens rea, as it is mentioned in solution one. The second solution will temporarily ensure the differentiation between 
homicide crimes, which is important to achieve justice and deterrence.
4- Qatari Penal Code, Article 32 (2004).
5- Aldein, supra note 25, at 343.
6- Kuwaiti Criminal Code, Article 40 (1960).
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mistake nor the standard that governs it; therefore, “mistake” is not sufficiently appropriate to 
become a default rule. Second, if the judge adopts the jurisprudential definition of mistake, it 
means that negligence (unconscious mistake) will be the default rule in these crimes. The negligent 
defendant, however, is unaware that he is committing a crime. Negligence is the lowest level of 
culpability and not sufficiently blameworthy to take this role,1 especially when most of the crimes 
in the Qatari Penal Code fall under the governance of this article. This adversely affects criminal 
justice, the principle of a fair trial, and the defendant’s right to defense, leading to the imposition 
of punishments on defendants regardless of whether the mens rea deserves punishment. 
Many scholars argue that negligence should not be punished at all, because it doesn’t generate a 
high enough level of culpability to merit punishing the defendant.2 Some laws, like the Model Penal 
Code, require a higher standard for proving negligence: gross negligence.3 Neither the Qatari Penal 
Code nor jurisprudence requires negligence to be gross in order to punish the defendant; ordinary 
negligence is sufficient to trigger the liability of the defendant.4 Therefore, mistake should not 
become the default rule because it is a lower level of culpability. Additionally, it would lead to 
more serious consequences, as the next points show.
Article No. 32 contradicts the legal logic of crime and punishment according to mens rea.5 The 
current situation means that no proportionality exists between the idea of culpability and the idea 
of punishment,6 as the punishment here becomes applicable to all degrees of culpability whether 
high or low. Each type of mens rea reflects a particular degree of culpability by the criminal, 
whether or not he was intentional, negligent, or reckless regarding the criminal result.7 Therefore, 
the current situation contradicts the idea of crime and punishment, because a crime cannot 
simultaneously be unintentional and intentional. All crime should be measured by a particular 
type of mens rea, and its punishment should reflect the type of mens rea involved.8
The problem of the default rule in Article No. 32 is it often leads to imposing a severe punishment 
on the defendant without giving him the opportunity to defend himself by arguing that he had no 
intention to commit the crime. There are more than 250 crimes in the Qatari Penal Code; the word 
“intention” is stated clearly in those crimes about fifty times, and the word “mistake” is stated 
about thirteen times. There are more than 190 crimes without a default rule, and the liability 
for them is determined without considering the mental state of the defendant. Those crimes 
have varied punishments, starting with the death sentence (Article Nos. 99, 101, 102, 103), life 
imprisonment (Article Nos. 104, 111), seven-year imprisonment (Article Nos. 157, 256), five-year 
imprisonment (Article No. 259), or ten-year imprisonment (Article No. 116). In these crimes, the 
criminal is punished regardless of his mental state, that is, the criminal is punished whether he 
committed the crime negligently or intentionally. This matter is very dangerous and prejudices 
criminal justice and the guarantee of the defendant’s rights. Some examples of these crimes include 
1- See George, P. Fletcher, The theory of criminal negligence: A comparative analysis, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401 (1970).
2- Id.
3- American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, vol. 1, 241 (Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1985).
4- Srouer, supra note 8, at 705.
5- Aldein, supra note 25, at 343.
6- See Smith, supra note 35, at 1. “The concept of moral culpability, namely proportionality of mens rea. This concept 
requires that the punishment must be tailored to the defendant’s level of blameworthiness.” See also Brown, supra note 
35, at 110. “This principle states that punishment must be in accord with or in proportion to culpability.”
7- Ted Sampsell-Jones, Mens rea in Minnesota and the Model Penal Code, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 6 (2013).
8- See Smith, supra note 35, at 1. 
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helping the enemy by giving him information or instructing him; retaining the salaries of workers; 
breaking, damaging, or violating places or their contents if they are made to perform religious 
rites for one of the divine religions according to the regulations of Islamic law; and opposing or 
doubting any of the basics or tenets of Islam. As these crimes result in severe punishment, the 
defendant should not be punished if he commits them mistakenly.
2. Solutions 
1. This solution recommends repealing this paragraph and drafting a new article that names intent 
as the default rule, so that criminals are not punished due to the commission of mistakes 
(involving either negligence or recklessness) except when clearly stated in the law. This 
amendment could be written as follows: There is no felony or misdemeanor in the absence of 
an intent to commit it. If the law does not clearly stipulate the punishment to the act because 
the act is coupled with a mistake, the defendant will not be punished unless the defendant 
had intent to commit the criminal result. The reason for choosing intent as a default rule 
is to stop punishing defendants who commit a crime due to negligence or recklessness. The 
defendant who intentionally commits a crime deserves the stated punishment for that crime, 
even if the intent is not clearly stated. Intent is the highest degree of culpability;1 in such cases, 
the defendant cannot allege that the punishment imposed on him is unfair because the intent 
supposes a severe punishment. The defendant who desires to commit a criminal result is the 
only one who deserves such punishment. This approach is adopted by many laws in the world 
such as French law, Kuwaiti law, and the Italian Penal Code. Additionally, Article No. 30 of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court states, “Unless otherwise provided, a person 
shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”2 This 
quote shows there is universal agreement that intent or even knowledge should be the default 
rule for crime, not a much lower level of mens rea (or mistake).
E. The Problem with the Number of Types of Mens Rea 
This section focuses on the current mens rea types mentioned in Article No. 32, and discusses one 
of the biggest problems with Article No. 32, that being the limited number of types of mens rea. 
Article No. 32 states that there are only two forms of mens rea, that is, “the mens rea of the crime 
is composed of intention or mistake.”3 
1. Negative Consequences
Such a truncated list of the types of mens rea limits and decreases the estimating authority of the judge 
to define the punishment, as the judge only has two options: label the crime intentional or unintentional, 
meaning that the defendant either did or did not intend to cause the result.4 This discretion is dangerous 
because the maximum punishment for an intentional crime could reach either the death sentence or 
life imprisonment, while the punishment for a mistake is generally six-months’ imprisonment.5 There is 
a large gap between these two punishments. In other words, such limited classification of the types of 
1- See Stuntz & Hoffmann, supra note 1, at 207–209.
2- UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), July 17, 1998, ISBN No. 92-
9227-227-6, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html.
3- Qatari Penal Code, Article 32 (2004).
4- This negative consequence does not contradict my concern about the broad discretion of the judges previously mentioned 
in section I. This research is concerned with the discretion that is based on jurisprudence, not the discretion that is based 
on law, because this discretion is neither limited nor restricted to any legal provision. 
5- For example, in the Qatari Penal Code, punishment for the crime of murder could reach the death sentence, while 
unintentional homicide merits three years’ imprisonment. 
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mens rea adversely affects the degrees of culpability and the hierarchy of punishment based on them (or 
the proportionality of mens rea).1 Intent is the maximum degree of culpability, and the minimum degree 
is mistake or negligence.2 The current distinctions focus only on the maximum and minimum degrees of 
culpability, neglecting the degrees in between. There is no hierarchy of culpability nor a hierarchy for 
punishment. Each punishment should reflect a defined degree of fault.3 The legislature considers that 
the mental and psychological states of the criminal reflect the maximum degree of fault (the desire to 
cause the criminal result), or the minimum degree, which is a mistake or non-awareness of the result. 
The Model Penal Code succeeds in defining the psychological and mental states that determine 
the criminal’s culpability.4 Culpability reflects a particular degree of mental or psychological state 
that leads to a particular punishment (though purposely and knowingly are usually punished the 
same way). That degree of fault, whether cognitive or moral, forms a particular type of mens rea 
in its elements, as demonstrated in the figure below.
FIGURE 15
For example, knowingly reflects a degree of fault, which is certainty, while recklessness reflects 
another degree of fault, which is substantial risk.
Resorting to jurisprudence may be a solution for judges who wish to avoid the problem of mens 
rea types, because the judiciary has noticed shortcomings regarding the types of mens rea and 
has resorted to jurisprudence to correct legislative omissions. But this may contradict many 
constitutional principles, including legality, as mentioned above. Also, this approach would be 
ineffective because the additional types of mens rea are considered as either intent or mistake; 
they do not add anything to the hierarchy of punishment as there are still only two types of mens 
rea according to the Qatari Penal Code.
1- See Stuntz & Hoffmann, supra note 1, at 207–209.
2- Robinson & Cahill, supra note 12, at 157.
3- See Smith, supra note 35, at 1. See also Brown, supra note 35, at 110.
4- See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 12, at 156.
5- See Michael S. Moore, Intention, responsibility, and the challenges of recent neuroscience, Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 8 (2009). 
This figure is from an essay by Moore about intention and recklessness. 
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2. Solutions 
One solution recommends amending Article No. 32 by abandoning the two current types of mens 
rea and replacing them with others. If the legislature adopts this solution, it would render the 
solutions for the first two problems unnecessary. These types will be discussed in the next section. 
This solution also recommends abandoning the examples in Article No. 32 that are related to 
mistake because they do not take into account the defendant’s mental state at the time of the 
crime. They also cause much ambiguity and overlap with other standards, as mentioned above.
III. a new model of Mens Rea
This model is intended to replace the current mens rea types with others that clearly express the 
mental and psychological states of the criminal when he committed the crime; additionally, it will 
help in achieving a hierarchy of punishment.1 These types of mens rea are divided into two sections. 
First, the general section shows the four general types of criminal culpability applicable to all offenses. 
These types are direct intent, indirect intent, recklessness, and negligence. Second, the special 
section focuses on the definition of particular offenses that consider two other types of mental state 
as aggravating circumstances. These types of mental state are exceedable intent and a special type 
for aggressive recklessness. These two types are not general and only applicable to certain offenses if 
the law so requires. 
A. The General Section
1. Direct Intent
A person acts intentionally when he/she engages in conduct intending to cause a result that 
is punishable by law.
2. Indirect Intent
A person acts with indirect intent when he/she is practically certain that his/her conduct 
will cause the criminal result, even if he/she does not directly intend to cause it. Unless the 
law states otherwise, the person who acts with indirect intent will be considered as acting 
intentionally and will be punished with the same punishment as someone who acted with 
direct intent. However, the defendant who commits the crime of murder with indirect intent 
will not be punished with the death sentence, contrary to the defendant who commits murder 
with direct intent.
Comment No. 1 
• The first type of mens rea described is direct intent, which refers to the criminal’s desire 
to cause the criminal result by engaging in criminal conduct. The criminal here is not only 
aware that the criminal result will occur because of his conduct, but he also intends (or 
desires) to cause this criminal result. The second type includes indirect intent (knowingly), 
as the criminal is aware (practically certain) that the criminal result will occur because of 
his criminal act. Practical certainty is the degree of awareness that is free of serious doubt, 
as the criminal is practically certain that the criminal result will occur according to the plan 
in his mind and the ordinary course of events.
• Punishment for indirect intent will be the same as direct intent unless the law differentiates 
between them. The defendant whose indirect intent led to a criminal result will fall under 
1- Many judges express their disagreement with the current situation, as the current situation limits the opportunity of 
imposing the appropriate punishment on the defendant as he is limited with an intentional crime. Now judges can impose 
a fair ruling from the varied punishments according to the mental state of the criminal when he commits the crime.
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the same consideration as the defendant whose direct intent led to a criminal result, unless 
the law states otherwise. I propose this article give the legislature the discretion to decide 
when it is necessary to differentiate between direct and indirect intent, that is, the legislator 
should be able to decide when the crime should be punished only under indirect intent. If 
direct and indirect intent are not considered the same, then indirect intent will be pointless 
unless the legislature amends all crimes in the Qatari Penal Code to include it, which will 
be difficult. This solution recommends that the legislature should amend only some crimes 
when necessary to distinguish between direct and indirect intent. Although the punishment 
for indirect intent will be the same as direct intent, the defendant will not be punished with 
the death penalty if he commits the crime of murder with indirect intent. In that case, life 
imprisonment should be imposed instead.
• The default rule will be direct intent.
• Those types of mens rea will repeal the current types of intent listed in the Qatari Penal 
Code, or general and specific intent. General intent will be replaced by direct intent. Specific 
intent will be governed by the article that discusses motive (Article 35).
3. Recklessness
A person acts recklessly when he is aware of the possibility that the result will occur due to his 
conduct but nevertheless disregards the possibility of its occurrence by continuing that conduct. 
Such disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person 
would observe in the actor’s situation. 
Comment No. 2
• This type of mens rea expresses the types of recklessness. It includes the conscious mistake 
form, but with amendments that help to clarify its meaning. 
• The distinguishing element in recklessness is the criminal’s degree of awareness regarding 
the result. Here, the degree of awareness is less than the degree of practical certainty. 
“Possibility” means the result can possibly happen. It includes all sorts of foresight that is 
attached to doubts that the result will occur. It is enough for the defendant to be liable, under 
this form of mens rea, when the possibility of the result occurrence crosses the defendant’s 
mind while he engages in the conduct.
• To avoid any ambiguity, the proposal explains the meaning of “disregard” with the phrase 
“continuing that conduct.” Without this phrase, the defendant could argue that he did not 
disregard the risk and tried to avoid it in order to escape punishment, while “continuing that 
conduct” is material, external evidence that can be identified and observed. Also, the standard 
to prove recklessness is objective under the defendant’s situation. However, the court must 
first be assured as to whether the defendant was aware that there was a possibility that the 
result would occur from his conduct, and the standard here is a subjective standard.
• The standard here is the gross deviation from the standard of a reasonable person. The 
ordinary deviation from the reasonable person standard must be the basis for civil liability, 
not criminal liability.
4. Negligence
A person acts negligently when he should have been aware of the possibility that the result would 
occur due to his conduct. The failure to perceive this possibility must involve a gross deviation 
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation. 
Comment No. 3
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• This is the definition of negligence as the non-awareness of the possibility of the result of 
occurrence.
• The standard is an objective under the defendant’s situation.
• The standard here is the gross deviation from the standard of a reasonable person. The 
ordinary deviation from the reasonable person standard must be the basis for civil liability, 
not criminal liability.
B. The Special Section
The special section focuses on the definition of particular offenses that consider two other types 
of mental state as aggravating circumstances for punishment. These two types are not general and 
only apply to certain offenses if the law so requires. 
1. Aggressive Recklessness
The defendant who acts with aggressive recklessness will receive more severe punishment than 
the defendant who acts with simple recklessness, because the aggressive recklessness of his 
conduct poses an extreme indifference to the value of human life, health, or property. 
The concept of aggressive recklessness shares the same definition of recklessness, but with 
the addition of one element related to criminal conduct.1 The defendant’s conduct in this type 
poses an extreme indifference to the value of life, money, or health. The defendant will then 
be subject to more severe punishment than the defendant who commits the crime with simple 
recklessness, because the criminal foresaw the occurrence of the result, but nevertheless he 
exposed people’s lives to extreme danger (e.g., death). However, he will not be punished by 
the death penalty in the case of murder. Applying a severe punishment to the defendant will 
help to deter future crimes of this sort, especially when this type of crime poses an extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.
Aggressive recklessness is similar to conditional intent because both of them share the same 
degree of awareness, that is, expecting the occurrence of the result.2 However, the difference 
is that aggressive recklessness involves aggressive conduct while conditional intent supposes 
the acceptance of a criminal result occurring.3 This solution recommends abandoning the 
conditional type for many reasons.
First, the standard for acceptance is unclear, inaccurate, and presumed.4 The criminal may or 
may not desire to cause the result, but he cannot accept a result that he does not desire, so 
the nature of acceptance is ambiguous from its qualities and specifications. That means the 
ambiguity of mens rea will increase and result in instability in the criminal judgments in Qatar. 
There are also considerable criticisms being directed at the degree of expectation required for 
the fulfillment of conditional intent since both jurisprudence and judges have provided different 
degrees of awareness for conditional intent.5 
1- State v. Robinson, 934 P.2d 38 (Kan. 1997).
2- Conditional intent means that the defendant foresees the result of his criminal act, and although he does not desire that 
result, he continues the act. Conditional intent is the most important type of mens rea in the civil law system because of 
the great controversy surrounding it. See also Judgment, Egyptian Court of Cassation, Case No. 1853 on December 25, 1930.
3- For more information about the similarity between conditional intent and recklessness, see Markus Dubber & Tatjana 
Hornle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach, 241 (1st ed., 2014).
4- Id.
5- Bhanm, supra note 27, at 623.
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Second, the penalty for intentional crimes is serious, even though the offender who acts 
with conditional intent does not intentionally cause the criminal result nor is he practically 
certain of its occurrence. This punishment may reach the death sentence, indicating that 
mere acceptance, not desire, becomes a reason to impose a severe punishment, though it 
is ambiguous and presumed.1 Regarding acceptance and the distinction between acceptance 
and desire, the German courts state that accepting the result as a condition for conditional 
intent does not mean that the defendant desired such a result. The defendant who accepted 
the result in order to fulfill his goal is deemed to have accepted the fact that his act could 
cause the undesired result.2 It is clear that this type of mens rea provides the judge with very 
broad discretion. The judge is also not obliged to explain the reasons that lead him to infer 
acceptance. The judge may presume the matter of acceptance without any mention of his 
reasons for concluding such acceptance.
Third, conditional intent overlaps with conscious mistake (or recklessness). The difference 
between conscious mistake and conditional intent is that in the latter, the defendant accepts 
the result and even welcomes it, whereas in the former, the defendant does not accept the 
result and depends on his skills to avoid it.3 If the defendant accepts the criminal result, then 
his penalty in homicide will escalate from three-years’ imprisonment to the death penalty. 
Acceptance is a strange criterion when compared to the graveness of the penalty. 
These reasons motivate us to recommend the abandoning of conditional intent and the 
replacement of it with another type of mens rea that quantifies conscious mistake only as 
an aggravating circumstance, much like the French legislature. The French legislature has 
abandoned the form of conditional intent, and uses only conscious mistake as an aggravating 
circumstance.4 This type of mens rea will replace conditional intent because accepting the result 
is an internal intangible matter, while the conduct that exposes people’s lives to extreme danger 
is a material and external matter that can be witnessed and observed. The defendant in such 
cases will have difficulty escaping punishment compared to cases involving conditional intent, 
in which the defendant may argue that he did not accept the result or tried to avoid it. The 
judge’s discretion will lessen and shift from presuming acceptance to proving the defendant’s 
material conduct posed an extreme risk to people’s lives. 
2. Exceedable Intent5
Exceedable intent is a special type of intent that is included in the Qatari Penal Code.6 The 
legislator should state its application separately in each crime. The reason for keeping it is to 
close the door to the criminal who committed an act that posed an extreme danger to human 
life, but alleged that he did not expect the possibility that the criminal result would occur. 
The QPC states, “Criminal intention is deemed to have been exceeded when the intention of 
1- Dubber & Hornle, supra note 70, at 241.
2- Id. The author states, “In the leather belt case, the German Federal Court of Justice emphasized that a volitional element 
(accepting) can be present even if the offender honestly claims that he had preferred the victim’s survival to the victim’s 
death.”
3- Bhanm, supra note 27, at 623.
4- See French Criminal Code, Art. 221-6. See also Catherine Elliott, French Criminal Law, 68 (2nd ed., 2011).
5- Qatari Penal Code, Article 33 (2004).
6- Exceedable intent is fulfilled when the defendant aims to cause a certain criminal result, but as a result of the aggressiveness 
of his conduct, another criminal result occurs that is more aggressive than the criminal result initially intended. For more 
information, see Srouer, supra note 8, at 649.
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the perpetrator was to produce a result less severe than that produced and which he did not 
intend.”1 This solution recommends that the legislator add the word “expected” in this article to 
reflect the accurate definition of exccedable intent. The article should state: Criminal intention 
is deemed to have been exceeded when the intention of the perpetrator was to produce a 
result less severe than that produced and which he did not intend and expect.
Conclusion
As stated in the beginning of this paper, the causes of ambiguity regarding mens rea are related to its 
wording, nature, and interpretation. Having presented the provisions of the Qatari Penal Code regarding 
mens rea, we can conclude that the legislative wording of mens rea contributes to its ambiguity. The 
ambiguity caused by the legislative wording is very serious, risky, and detrimental to the people’s rights 
and the constitutional principles that aim to protect individuals’ rights and freedom. We can blame this 
ambiguity on the legislature’s omission, which uses unclear and inaccurate vocabularies or phrases to 
address mens rea, and fails to define the distinguishing elements of each type of mens rea. Each of those 
matters has resulted in varied explanations and analyses about the concept of mens rea and the contents 
of its types.
Furthermore, the Qatari Penal Code only includes two forms of mens rea, which ultimately undermines 
the role of mens rea and decreases its effectiveness and importance, because the judge has only two 
options: to accuse the defendant under either intention or mistake. The legislative omission also 1) leads 
to the legislature’s ignorance of including legal provisions that could end disputes and solve the problems 
with conditional intent; 2) results in having an inappropriate default rule for mens rea, which is important 
for applications in criminal justice; and 3) results in assigning conscious mistake the same punishment as 
unconscious mistake. These are the most significant consequences of the Qatari Penal Code’s wording of 
mens rea; in short it causes ambiguity in understanding mens rea on the one hand, and the disruption of 
the application of mens rea on the other.
The ambiguity found in the Qatari Penal Code is abnormal and odd. Reasonable ambiguity takes place 
when legislation uses some ambiguous terms or phrases in order to give judges room to evaluate their 
cases without being bound to legal texts, which will help the judge to apply justice, but this room should 
be granted according to the legal texts. However, the ambiguity found in the current Qatari Penal Code 
is not granted by the legislature in the legal texts, but caused by the omission of legal texts that define 
the mens rea types or elements. That legislative omission, whether by disregarding some legal texts or 
choosing very ambiguous terms, provides judges with very broad discretion without requiring them to 
adhere to any legal restrictions.
The proposed solutions in this paper will not clarify all of the ambiguity surrounding mens rea nor will they 
solve all of its associated problems, but they will definitely contribute to the understanding of mens rea in 
terms of its definition, elements, and types. If these recommendations are adopted, they will help judges 
and individuals to understand the concept and the important role of mens rea. These recommendations will 
not only help to reduce the ambiguity surrounding mens rea, but they will also contribute to the variation 
of punishments that can be imposed on criminals. 
1- Qatari Penal Code, Article 33 (2004).
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